



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

**Top Secret**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Saturday  
14 August 1982***

State Dept. review completed

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
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
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GUATEMALA: Rios Montt's Improving Position

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*President Rios Montt's success in persuading leaders of the four major political parties to participate in the Council of State indicates his hold on power is improving.*

The US Embassy reports the Council--to be headed by Rios Montt--will advise the executive branch and review government decrees, but it will not make policy itself. A major initial task of the Council when it is formed later this month will be proposing revisions in the electoral law. In exchange for support from the parties, Rios Montt reportedly promised to convene a constituent assembly before July 1983 and to establish a timetable for elections.

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Comment: The decision to join the Council may widen the reported split among the leadership of the strongest party, the rightwing National Liberation Movement.

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COSTA RICA: Cabinet Feud

*President Monge has temporarily quelled a jurisdictional dispute between two of his ministers, one of whom reportedly is cooperating with the Sandinistas.* [redacted]

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The clash between Foreign Minister Volio and Public Security Minister Solano followed the latter's signing last week of a joint communique in Nicaragua concerning frictions along the border. The document denies Sandinista involvement in terrorism in Costa Rica and recognizes that country's right of navigation on the San Juan River, the scene of increasing Nicaraguan harassment of Costa Rican tourist boats. Monge publicly disavowed provisions relating to the river as being outside Solano's purview. [redacted]

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Volio was angered by Solano's infringement, and only intervention by Monge prevented his resignation. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, former Nicaraguan revolutionary hero Eden Pastora has publicly accused Solano of having close ties to the Sandinistas, a charge Solano has denied. [redacted]

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## SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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KENYA: Aftermath of the Coup Attempt  
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*President Moi's aggressive reaction to the coup attempt on 1 August by disgruntled Air Force officers will intimidate his opponents and give him some time to tighten government control. Over the longer term, however, the frictions in the military, intensified tribal tension, and the continuing economic slump may weaken political stability. Kenya's relations with the US are likely to be strengthened for now as a result of the incident, but increasing disaffection with Moi at home eventually could jeopardize US interests as well.* [redacted]

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The Army's investigation of the Air Force has brought the long-festering animosity between the two services to a head. Air Force officers have long looked down on the largely illiterate Army. [redacted]

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Army personnel investigating the incident reportedly are treating Air Force officers brutally, some of whom have been killed. Moi appears likely to purge the Air Force. [redacted]

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The civilian security forces and the Army probably will demand a larger voice in the government now that they sense their political power. Some officers may seek new authority and encourage further plotting in the military. [redacted]

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In addition to dealing harshly with the plotters, Moi is likely to place more restrictions on dissent. Over the past several months he has established a one-party state and has lashed out repeatedly against teachers, students, and journalists. These actions could alienate more Kenyans and lead them to violent opposition. [redacted]

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Tribal and Economic Pressures

The actions taken by Moi almost certainly will intensify Kenya's chronic tribal rivalries. Junior Air Force


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officers from the country's second-largest tribe, the Luo, are said to have planned the coup. [redacted]

Moi reportedly is convinced the patriarch of the tribe and other Luo politicians were involved. Ethnic tensions already are strained over the disproportionate share of high-level government and military positions held by members of the largest tribe, the Kikuyu, and Moi's own small tribe, the Kalenjin. [redacted]

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Although Kenya is in better shape economically than most African countries, it is experiencing a recession caused by the high birthrate, rising import costs, and falling export earnings. These difficulties are not likely to be resolved soon. The economic decline and widespread corruption have cost the government support and appear certain to lead to additional unrest. [redacted]

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#### Regional Reactions

The coup attempt probably will have only a limited effect on foreign policy. There is no evidence of outside involvement, even though Moi claims the Soviets had advance knowledge of the attempt. He probably said that to get more US aid and to deflect blame for the uprising from himself and his government. [redacted]

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The incident is unlikely to alter Kenya's relations with its neighbors. Somali President Siad sent a note of congratulations to Moi after the uprising was foiled, but Moi remains apprehensive about Somali claims on Kenyan territory and about US arms shipments to Mogadishu. [redacted]

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Tanzanian President Nyerere has said that he will return a hijacked Kenyan plane used by two plotters to escape to Tanzania, [redacted]

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The Stake for the US

Moi is seeking greater US support and is associating himself more closely with the US. If the fundamental problems that gave rise to the takeover attempt continue to get worse, as seems likely, US interests in Kenya eventually could be damaged. A close US identification with an increasingly unpopular, repressive Moi regime would make Kenya's relations with the US--particularly the military access agreement--a more frequent subject of criticism by the opposition.

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